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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies international knowledge flows looking at (1) patent citations that track codified 
knowledge and (2) technological collaborations between inventors that gauge knowledge transmitted 
through face to face contacts. It uses a gravity model for 13 countries (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, 
China, South Africa and Mexico and USA, UK, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Canada) using EPO 
data. Economic and institutional barriers exist to knowledge flows. Geographical distance has an indirect 
effect in particular through trade. Sharing a common legal origin and technological proximity favor the 
transfer of knowledge. When knowledge is tacit the economic (e.g. trade) and institutional determinants 
(e.g. legal origin) of knowledge flows have a much stronger impact. Finally there may be some adverse 
effects on knowledge flows generated by the reinforcement of IPRs in developing countries and in 
particular by the TRIPs agreements. 
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Introduction 
International research collaborations and joint international patenting have been rising globally. 
Globalization and the diffusion of information and communication technologies increased the 
opportunities for collaborating, cooperating and sourcing knowledge from physically distant agents. In 
addition, the technological convergence and the emergence of new technological paradigms (such as 
biotechnology and nanotechnology) increased the need for carrying out joint research projects, which 
usually involve partners located in different countries. These trends multiply the opportunities for 
international knowledge flows through augmented possibilities of interaction between individuals and 
organizations. How those opportunities are translated into practice, and who is capturing the benefits 
depend, at the country level, on different factors, such as the accumulated capacities of the different agents, 
the prevailing specialization pattern, and also on the institutional management of innovation policy and 
intellectual property.  
As innovation goes global, there is a rising demand for global knowledge governance. However, 
which mix of policies better supports the generation and diffusion of knowledge in global economies is still 
an open debate. Innovation policies per se are recently addressing the issue of international collaboration 
and international knowledge flows in their design phase; intellectual property protection is, probably, the 
domain in which policies have pioneered the extension of homogeneous standards across countries. The 
TRIPS agreement and the inclusion of IP chapters in bilateral trade and investment agreements (basically 
pursued by the US with developing and emerging economies) pushed for international harmonization of 
intellectual property rights thus shaping international regime for knowledge appropriation and circulation.  
Starting from the 90s there has been a rising demand (especially pursued by the US) for regulations 
and legal mechanisms supporting intellectual property appropriability across countries. Actually, the issues 
related with IP management are frequently a bottleneck in the implementation of international research 
programs. It is quite obvious that asymmetries in intellectual property institutions and law challenge a 
smooth circulation of knowledge. Different legal legislations, differences in patent exceptions, patent 
subject matters and enforcement conditions, just to name a few, are considered to affect firms’ decisions to 
locate firms in given countries, to influence the willingness to undertake collaborative research projects and 
to search for joint patent protection.  
However, the prevailing legal framework is only one of the reasons that affect the decisions to 
collaborate for innovation with foreign partners. Usually, collaboration with foreign partners is manly 
determined by the need to access the capabilities (research or/and market based) and the knowledge (tacit 
or codified) embedded in the foreign partner. When the key motivation beyond collaboration is the 
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uniqueness of the knowledge of the foreign counterpart and its value for the research or the business 
strategy of the partner, than asymmetries in IP regimes will tend to play a second order effect in agents’ 
choices of collaborations. Nevertheless, international collaboration in applied research originates a demand 
for regulatory systems which should be suitable for incentivizing innovation at the international level on 
fair basis.  
In fact, countries differ in terms of technological specialization, accumulated capacities and 
institutions supporting the functioning of national innovation systems. The asymmetry between countries 
capabilities makes explicit that common rules and appropriability regimes impact different actors in 
different ways. The demand and supply of collaborations and knowledge flows for innovation is 
internationally asymmetric. And it is likely to be a more diffused phenomenon for (and between) advanced, 
already technologically advanced countries rather than for developing economies, which, at the aggregate 
level, basically lack the capabilities both to be suitable counterparts in research and to demand 
collaboration from foreign partners. However, for the latter the relevance of international collaboration in 
research and in inventive activity, although it is not determinant in share or allocated resources, it is 
extremely valuable for the transfer of tacit knowledge, routines and experience which derives from face-to-
face interaction and from the development of common shared practices ensuing from research 
collaboration.  
In fact, while the impact of technology transfer on developing countries is considered, in the 
developmental literature, a necessary but not sufficient condition for modernization and catching up, if not 
matched by policies supporting the generation and strengthening of domestic capabilities, international 
knowledge flows are unanimously seen as positive and necessary elements for supporting catching up. 
Learning happens through cumulative processes of trial and errors. And collaboration in research is one of 
the channels through which information, knowledge and to some extent know-how flow between partners. 
Usually, joint research projects involve not only the exchange of technical information, but also the 
voluntary and involuntary transmission of know-how, procedures and routines, issues which make those 
collaborations, and the associated learning processes, of extreme relevance for catching up countries which 
are in the process of strengthening their capabilities.  
Knowledge transmission from more advanced countries supports the catching up with the 
technological frontier; on the contrary, technological isolation slows down the development process and it 
is conducive to technological and economic divergence. The possibility of significant spillovers in the 
process of international knowledge diffusion has stimulated interest in technology transfer and has raised 
inevitably issues of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. However, developing countries encounter 
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difficulties to “catch up” despite (and in some cases as a consequence of) the introduction of 
homogeneous and stronger IP regimes. In fact, the assumption that knowledge transfer can be easily 
accomplished is wrong. This is because thinking of technology in terms of blue prints and formulae is 
inadequate. A more advanced conceptualization of technology should include not only materials and 
knowledge codified in patents, blueprints and manuals but also know-how, routines and organizational 
capabilities, much of which is tacit in nature (Dosi, 1988). 
Tacit knowledge is costly to transfer, and its transferability is limited by its embeddedness in 
individuals, teams and organizations.  In this context particular attention is placed on the absorptive 
capacity, learning processes and the ability of the recipient country to evaluate and effectively use the 
transferred knowledge and technology. This is why research on knowledge diffusion through inter-personal 
links across countries has recently come to the fore. Possibly international knowledge spillovers are mainly 
driven not only by the effective transfer of codified knowledge, but also by interpersonal links and face-to-
face contacts across countries. International collaboration for developing countries plays a key role in 
accessing knowledge and good technology practices from abroad, and in speeding up the learning process.  
Some evidence indicates that not only international collaboration between inventors is growing but 
also that international co-operation has a positive a significant effect on domestic innovative activity. In 
addition, developing countries seem to benefit significantly when domestic inventors collaborate with 
foreign inventors in developed countries (Montobbio and Sterzi, 2011). 
TRIPS represent the biggest change in global IP regimes at the international level of the last two 
decades. The development literature has stressed, from many different points of view and on the basis of 
various argumentations, the (adverse) impact of the 1994 treaty on developing countries’ technological 
catching up (Basheer, 2005; UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2005; Cimoli et al. 2009). However, while it is increasingly 
recognized that international flows of technological knowledge and collaboration in innovation affect 
importantly countries’ ability to learn and innovate, few studies address the impact of TRIPS on 
international knowledge flows. This paper goes in this direction. It examines whether the upstream 
homogenization of IP regimes across countries, introduced by TRIPS in 1994, has supported international 
knowledge flows and international collaboration in research, as it was supposed to do in theory. Beyond 
the factors which have been already highlighted by the (controversial) literature on TRIPS and 
development (impact on FDI, on R&D incentives, on prices, etc.) there could be something more “under 
the radar”. The impact on the learning trajectory and of effective knowledge-and-know-how transfer from 
advanced to developing and emerging economies is an issue which should enter with plain rights into the 
analysis of the impact of a new IP legislation in catching up and developing economies.  
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This paper studies the impact of the strengthening and homogenization of IPRs at the international 
level introduced by TRIPS on international knowledge flows, as measured by patent citations (which track 
the origin and direction of codified knowledge flows) and co-inventorship (as a proxy of technological 
collaboration that gauge knowledge that is transmitted through interpersonal and face to face contacts). 
The study is based on the international patent databases from the European Patent Office (EPO) and it 
covers 13 countries: the G7 (USA, UK, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Canada) and a group of 
emerging economies, the BRICSM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico). We use a 
modified version of a gravity equation to model bilateral technological cooperation and bilateral knowledge 
flows to test the impact of the strengthening of IPRs introduced by TRIPS.  
In Section 1 we briefly analyze the evolution of international IPRs introduced by TRIPS and the 
impact of patenting on emerging and developing economies. Section 2 explains the two indicators used for 
measuring knowledge flows. Section 3 explores the available empirical evidence on the impact of TRIPS on 
knowledge flows. Section 4 presents the data and the empirical model and, finally, Section 5 discusses the 
results of the econometric exercise. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.  Harmonizing IP standards in a heterogeneous setting: an overview of the TRIPS 
 
IP regimes are regulatory frameworks embodied in evolving socio-economic systems; hence 
they are subject to change and evolution, on the basis of a combination of demand-push and 
technology push incentives. Since the 80s advanced economies, especially the US entered into a “pro-
patent” era introducing modifications in their national IP legislation which extended the patentable 
subject matter, enriching the scope for patentability and which induced, basically through the Bahy-
Dole Act, a transition to a more proprietary and commercialization-oriented science model, 
increasingly supporting the commercialization of university research (Dasgupta and David, 1994; 
Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Mowery et al. 2004). 
The Uruguay Round succeeded in setting most of those reforms as basic international 
standards for WTO members by the adoption of the TRIPS agreement. The adoption of the TRIPS 
agreement in 1994 marked a milestone in the big push towards homogeneous internaitonal minimum 
standards of IP protection. The progressive internationalization of IP protection went hand in hand 
with the increase in international trade and interactions between countries entailed by globalization, and 
was pulled by new interests arising from new technological paradigms and the rising articulation of 
global production processes. 
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TRIPS establishes minimum standards of homogeneous protection among WTO members, 
introducing the two basic WTO principles in IP management: the national treatment and the most favored 
nation treatment (TRIPS, articles 3 and 4). According to these principles, each WTO member is required to 
treat nationals of other member states at least as well as its own nationals, and to treat all other member 
states on an equivalent basis in relation to the protection of intellectual property. 
 In recent years developing countries expanded significantly the strength of their IPR legislations to 
comply with TRIPS requirement (Basheer, 2005). TRIPS requires that WTO member nations enact and 
enforce laws on copyrights, trademarks and patents to protect intellectual property. Rights expanded in 
many fields such as computer software, publications of various types, and pharmaceuticals. Besides the 
special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions which confer specific rights to LDC (Least Developed 
Countries) and a series of flexibilities, the Agreement put the reform and strengthening of IP in the 
innovation policy agenda of developing and emerging economies. 
The basic rationale for the international harmonization and reinforcement of IPRs is based on three 
arguments. (1) Stronger IPRs would support technology transfer by reducing the risks to establish 
multinational corporations operations in developing countries (2) would create more incentives to sell 
goods in these markets, (3) would enhance international knowledge transfer through the development of 
markets for technologies. Arguments against the TRIPS policy emphasize the possibility of important 
welfare losses due to market power pricing, the costs of closing down infringing activities, higher imitation 
costs and other risks related to patenting indigenous knowledge, enforcement problems and the adverse 
impact on the trajectory of technological learning and catching up, as well as the mismatch between IP 
policies, innovation policy and industrial policy (Cimoli and Primi, 2008; Cimoli et al. 2009). 
After the introduction of TRIPS, many scholars and polcy analysts studyied and assessed the impact 
of the agreement on developing countries. Various papers offered different measures of the effect of the 
TRIPS on trade, FDIs and innovation, as well as access to drugs. Generally, this literature suggests that the 
extension of patent protections under TRIPS has nuanced effects that varied by product category, country, 
and development level. 
For example, McCalman (2001) estimated that the benefits from the harmonization of patent are 
concentrated mainly in the US. Kanwar and Evenson (2003) found evidence that IP rights spurred 
innovation (or at least investment in research and development) in a sample of 29 countries from 1981-
1995. Allred and Park (2007) studied innovative activity in a panel of countries and find that there is no 
evident relationship between IPRs, R&D investment and patenting activity in developing countries. Qian 
(2007 and 2008) show no statistically significant relationship between national pharmaceutical-patent 
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protection and innovation or FDI establishments. The author shows, however, that the interactions of 
national patent-law implementation with development level, educational attainment, and economic 
freedom, respectively, are shown to have a positive relationship with domestic R&D expenditures and 
domestic pharmaceutical-patent awards in the United States after national patent implementation. Coriat et 
al. (2006) show the adverse impact of TRIPS on access to drugs and health-care strategies in developing 
countries. Recent evidence about the impact of the TRIPs in the pharmaceutical sectors on investments 
and trade can be also found in Kyle and McGahan (2009) and Delgado et al. (2011). Overall this evidence 
suggests that the indirect link between reinforced IPRs and increased international knowledge flows should 
not be very strong. 
 Actually, patenting has intensified in the last decades. Year after year, patent offices receive a 
growing number of applications, and they are granting more patents, although this exponential growth 
showed signs of decline in the last 4-5 years. The increase in patenting activity is occurring globally. The 
leading economies in terms of technological and industrial capabilities still are major players; however, 
activity has also intensified in emerging economies and developing countries, paving the way for a 
reconfiguration of the traditional knowledge club. The North–South asymmetry in the dynamics of 
patenting activities corresponds to the North–South asymmetry in technological intensity of production 
structures and specialization patterns. That is, countries’ participation in world patenting depends on the 
dynamics of their production structures and their processes of structural change. Developing countries 
spend few financial resources on R&D, as they are in general specialized in low-knowledge intensive 
activities, especially natural resources and labor-intensive industries, and their domestic innovation efforts 
are basically adaptive in nature and rarely encompass inventions and scientific discoveries. Consequently 
their patenting activity is scarce. In contrast, industrialized countries are more specialized in knowledge- 
and technology-intensive sectors and they invest more resources in R&D; it therefore comes as no surprise 
that they are also leaders in the number of patents applied for and granted (Cimoli et al. 2005; Montobbio, 
2008). 
If patenting activity is in general scant, we are aware that international patenting is a tiny portion of 
the innovative activity of emerging economies, not to mention developing countries. However we are not 
interested in the “magnitude” per se of the phenomenon, but on its implications on learning and 
knowledge transfer to domestic agents, in a cumulative process of catching up. Besides the “number of 
agents involved” the phenomena matters for its dynamic cumulative evolution. If knowledge flows from 
advanced to emerging countries represent one of the ways for learning and acquiring practice through 
direct collaboration, it is relevant to assess the impact of TRIPS not only on FDI or domestic innovation 
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efforts, but on knowledge flows and joint collaborations in order to assess the impact on ongoing 
collaborations and contacts. In the data session, therefore, we give a precise quantitative assessment of the 
size of the phenomenon we are studying (see also Montobbio, 2008 for a broader discussion on 
international patenting in developing countries). 
 
 2 Measuring International Knowledge Flows: Patent Citations and Co-inventorship. 
 
The economic literature has emphasized two ways of empirically tracking knowledge flows: patent 
citations and co-inventorship. This paper, in line with the literature, estimates the impact of IPRs 
reinforcement on both types of knowledge flows, which account for different types of knowledge flows and 
interactions between agents. Patent citations measure the transfer of codified and published knowledge. 
Collaboration via co-inventorship, i.e number of patents co-signed by inventors living in different countries, 
is a proxy of knowledge flows generated by interpersonal and social links deriving from joint collaboration. 
Patent citations measure flows of knowledge acquired by direct reading and comprehension of written and 
available documents, while co-inventor-ship can be used to track the transfer of non-codified knowledge 
(e.g. technical know-how, non-standardized production procedures etc.), which requires, at least 
periodically, face-to-face interactions.  Collaboration via co-inventorship is particularly relevant since it is 
likely to have a great impact on technological learning and on making technology transfer effective. 
There is a long tradition of studies that use patent citations to measure the value of the inventions 
and to map knowledge spillovers (Griliches, 1990). Albert et al. (1991) and Trajtenberg (1990) are among 
the first authors who have shown that patents with a higher economic and technological importance are 
also highly cited. Since then a considerable number of paper has used patent citations to track knowledge 
flows and spillovers (Jaffe et al. 1993, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1996, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Maurseth and 
Verspagen, 2002; Malerba and Montobbio, 2003; Peri 2005; Bacchiocchi, Montobbio 2009 and 2010). 
In this paper we use patent citations at the EPO. At the EPO, patent citations are included in the 
patent document mainly by the patent examiners in their examination report. Patent citations delimit the 
scope of the property right and point to the prior art that can possibly invalidate the patent. Citations have 
a legal value and they are considered a particularly reliable indicator. In this paper we assume that if patent 
A cites patent B, the inventors that signed patent A know and use the knowledge embedded in B. In this 
way patent citations provide a possible knowledge trail that can be used to measure international 
knowledge flows. If, for example, a patent signed by a Brazilian inventor cites a patent signed by a 
Canadian inventor, it can be assumed that some knowledge created in the Canada is used in Brazil and, as a 
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result, patent citations could track the direction of knowledge spillovers among the two inventors and the 
two countries1.  
Knowledge flows via direct collaboration in research and face to face contacts are also important for 
innovation activities. The recognition of the relevance of personal interaction for knowledge transfer led the 
literature to measure knowledge flows through co-inventorship.  Actually, knowledge and know-how 
embodied in individuals and firms circulates mainly through informal and non-codified face-to-face 
interactions and it involves different spheres, such as mobility of workers and researchers, participation to 
executive boards, effective participation in joint research programs etc.  Co-inventorship can be used as a 
proxy of direct interaction, and hence transfer of experience, routines and knowledge between co-inventors.  
Recently the literature has been using co-inventorship to to capture knowledge transfer between 
regions and countries (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Hoekman et al. 2009; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2012). Singh 
(2006) analyzes if and how interpersonal networks determine knowledge diffusion patterns in terms of 
geographic localization and intra-firm transfers using USPTO data since 1975. He finds that flows are 
stronger within firm and within regions than across them. He explores direct and indirect network ties 
between inventors, using past co-signed patents and finds that the social link between inventors is 
associated with a greater probability of knowledge flow (measured by patent citations), with the probability 
decreasing as the social ‘distance’ between inventors increases. Breschi and Lissoni (2009) show that 
inventors’ mobility and the co-invention network are crucial determinants of knowledge diffusion. 
 The characteristics and the density of the community of inventors and the networks arising among 
them play a relevant role in the innovative process. Research collaborations create social networks which 
can foster mutual learning. Actually, joint research efforts and collaborations create opportunities for 
learning which go beyond the exchange of formalized and codified information and knowledge.  
Participation or exclusion from given research networks not only affect the innovative performance of the 
country, the region,  the firm or the individual in question, it also affect the set of possibilities for learning 
routines and practices.  
Besides the growing and cumulative efforts, measuring knowledge flows is certainly something that 
escapes the logic of a Cartesian analysis; however, using both patent citations and co-inventorships allows 
us to grasp, at least tentatively, the two main dimensions of knowledge flows: the codified and the tacit one.   
 
                                                 
1 Jaffe et al. (2000) tested this conjecture using USPTO patents and surveyed approx 380 citing and cited inventors. Results 
suggest that “communication between inventors is reasonably important, and that patent citations do provide an indication of 
communication, albeit one that also carries a fair amount of noise” (p. 215). 
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3 Does Patent Strength Facilitate International Knowledge Flows?  
This paper studies the determinants of these two different types of knowledge flows using a gravity 
model. In particular we ask whether strengthening IPRs increases knowledge flows between advanced and 
emerging economies. We consider bilateral knowledge flows between G7 and BRICSM countries and assume 
that they depend upon some joint characteristics of the two countries. Following the literature we study 
whether variables such as the economic size and innovative activities of the two countries, their 
geographical distance, the presence of common cultural roots, the level of foreign direct investment and 
bilateral trade, have an impact on knowledge flows. However, in particular we test how the adoption of 
TRIPS and the consequent increase in IP protection affects knowledge flows via patent citations and via co-
inventorship.  
Standard  economic analysis suggests that stronger IPRs increase the incentives of foreign companies 
to invest in knowledge related activities and also create more incentives to innovate for domestic 
companies. Moreover the (indirect) link between IPRs and knowledge flows passes through the level and 
composition of innovative activities. The general intuition is that an exogenous change in IP legislation in 
developing countries could raise the innovativeness of domestic companies and increase their economic 
openness, via FDIs, imports and joint ventures. Increased R&D of domestic companies and openness 
could generate an increased level of international technological cooperation. Generally the strength of IPRs 
in a developing country should reassure companies willing to invest and develop technologies in these 
countries and, indirectly, be conducive to increased level of domestic technological activity and 
technological collaborations. Moreover new harmonized legislation and stricter enforcement generate 
greater incentives to disclose technological knowledge. Likewise, as long as stronger IPRs stimulate trade, 
FDI and international joint ventures this may improve both the probability of direct international 
collaborations between inventors and the probability of international patent citations (Park and Lippoldt, 
2008). 
However it has also been suggested that increased patent protection could harm innovative 
activities in developing countries. Part of the explanation comes from the discussion on the possible 
different strategies that multinational companies may adopt. As long as MNCs use patents to prevent the 
use or import of a specific technology this could harm domestic production and innovation. Moreover 
with stronger IPRs and stricter enforcement we can expect less international knowledge flows through 
imitation and adoption and the closing down infringing activities. Worries have also been expressed that 
stronger IPRs generate higher cost of access to imported technologies and difficulties in accessing basic 
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scientific knowledge (McCalman, 2001; Grossman and Lai, 2004; Lai, 2008; Lerner 2000, Thompson and 
Rushing 1996; Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998). 
If stronger IPRs end up hindering the research activity of developing countries in particular (maybe 
high tech) sectors and changing the structure and composition of their innovative activities we can expect a 
decline in the use of foreign technology in some fields and less international technological collaboration. 
Moreover strong domestic IPRs makes the local market more contendible and this may have an adverse 
effect on the domestic market structure, through mergers or acquisitions, and hence lead to a greater 
market concentration (Lesser, 1998), ultimately leading to the erosion of the local technical base. 
Take now separately into account the effects on IPRs reinforcement on the two types of knowledge 
flows we consider in this paper. With respect to patent citations, we expect a positive impact of IP 
reinforcement on patent citations as long as this increases the use of foreign technology in the domestic 
technological activity of the developing countries. IP reinforcements may increase directly the use of 
technology facilitating the construction of domestic technological capabilities not only through higher 
incentives for domestic firms to perform R&D but also through technology markets, licenses, technology 
outsourcing and contracts, enhancing also the overall capacity to absorb foreign knowledge. In parallel, 
there is a indirect effect through for example FDI and imports. At the same time stronger patent protection 
may hinder the use of foreign technology in particular for the potentially infringing innovative activities. In 
this case we should observe a decrease in patent citations. Moreover strengthening IPRs may also make 
more competitive the domestic market reducing the incentive to disclose knowledge and ideas (i.e. the 
opportunity cost of revealing information is higher). Potential limitations on the free use of foreign 
technology could lead to abandon innovative activities that eventually could have turned into an 
international patent application.  
Moreover the use of foreign technology depend directly on the level of international technological 
collaboration. So we can consider the second type of knowledge flows measured by co-signed international 
patents and discuss how stronger IP may increase or decrease the incentives of companies in advanced 
countries to undertake international technological cooperation with companies in developing countries. In 
principle IPRs should reduce the costs of contracting because they generate a clearer definitions of the 
technologies and higher certainty about the enforceability of contracts. As a result of a reinforcement of 
IPRs, we should therefore observe more trade, FDIs and more R&D collaborations between developed 
and developing countries. 
We note also that - when it comes to international technological collaboration - different channels 
of technology transfer may be used. Companies and research laboratories in order to make profits out of 
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their discoveries may pursuit different innovative and collaborative strategies. These different innovative 
strategies keep into account not only the strength of IP but also a lot of other variables like market size, the 
degree of appropriability, the intensity of the competition, the type of knowledge base, power relationships 
and the degree of asymmetry in the technological capabilities. Some evidence shows that substantial 
technological collaboration takes place also when strong IPRs are not enforced (e.g. Lanjouw, 1998 and 
Cockburn and Lanjouw, 2001). In this context it is not obvious how an IP reform that generate stronger 
patents and greater enforceability in developing countries could affect international technological 
collaboration. Consider the following example. 
Let’s assume that there are two countries (North and South). The North has stronger IPRs than the 
South. Assume also that there are two companies (A) and (B) with different level of technological 
capabilities. Company A is technologically more sophisticated and operates in the North and company B 
operates in the South. Company A discovers a new plant variety with new characteristics (e.g. in terms of 
therapeutic properties, resistance to specific pathogens or taste). Company B has a lab making research in 
the same field that could be a competitor and, at the same time, could adapt the plant variety to the local 
environment to set up for example production facilities. Company A may have an incentive to collaborate 
with company B not only for local production but also for international markets, if the product can be 
exported and the main destination markets are in the North. This leads to joint research, knowledge 
transfer and, eventually, company A could decide to file together with company B a patent in the 
destination markets. 
How is this situation affected by modifications in the patent legislation in the South? May the 
international patent harmonization - and the resulting strengthening of IP for less developed countries - 
reduce the incentive for company A to cooperate with company B ? In principle, with stronger IPRs, 
markets guarantee that company B does not misappropriate the technology of company A. This could 
generate a greater level of technological cooperation and technology transfer. However considering specific 
characteristics of technologies, markets and companies may lead to a less optimistic view. 
 
(1) Company A could not want to share its tacit knowledge with a potential competitor: strengthening 
of IP makes the local market appealing and potentially profitable. Interpersonal links and face-to-
face cooperation involve a substantial transfer of knowledge. Not only knowledge that can be 
codified but also tacit knowledge.  
(2) Strong IPRs and the creation of a market for technology may increase the incentive to license and 
decrease the incentives to undertake technological cooperation. With a weak patent legislation 
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company A could find more profitable the cooperative solution (possibly with a fee or an access 
price), conversely with a strong patent legislation company A can always force company B to buy a 
license on its technology.  
(3) Patents may involve substantial litigation and transaction costs. Company A could not want to 
cooperate with company B simply because it does not want to spend time and resources to 
negotiate complex licensing agreement. 
(4) Company A may wish to access directly the market in the South that thank to IP reform is now 
more profitable. In many cases to cooperate technologically with a local company can provide 
increased appropriability because the local company can have important complementary assets, in 
particular the ability to adapt products to local needs and distribute them. Patent reform may 
change the appropriabilty strategy of foreign companies that can use stronger IP and stricter 
enforceability (instead of technological cooperation) to make profits out of their new products and 
processes. 
4. Data and Methodology 
Our patent data come from the EP‐KITES data set, which contains complete information on all 
patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). In particular we use all patent applications from 
13 countries from 1990 to 20042. We consider six developing countries: Brazil, Russian Federation, India, 
China, South Africa and Mexico (BRICSM) and 7 advanced countries (G7): Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK and US3. Patents are assigned to countries using the addresses of the inventors and, in 
particular, are assigned to a specific country i if there is at least one inventor resident in country i. 
Our analysis focuses in particular upon international technological collaborations and knowledge 
flows between developing and developed countries: 
(1) We observe an international technological collaboration between country A and country B 
when a patent is co-signed by at least one inventor resident in country A and at least one inventor resident 
in country B4. A possible noise in the data can be generated by individual inventors that work abroad but 
keep on declaring the address of the home country (e.g. Montobbio and Sterzi, 2012 for a discussion). We 
control for this by excluding those patents where the number of domestic inventors is less than 20% of the 
total number of inventors in the team. For example if we observe a patent with 6 US inventors and one 
Brazilian inventor we could argue that this is not an international collaboration between Brazil and the US 
                                                 
2 In case of Russian Federation the panel goes from 1995 to 2004 due to missing information on IPR index till 1995 (Park, 
2008).  
3 The sample for the BRICSM countries is composed by 15035 patent applications, which have been signed by 30090 inventors. 
4 If a patents is signed by three inventors from three different countries in our sample, we consider all three bilateral relations. 
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but rather that there is a Brazilian inventor working in a US institution. Table A1 in the Appendix shows 
that the majority of collaborative patents have a share of domestic inventors which is higher or equal to 
20%. On average this share ranges between 70% for Brazil and 91% for Russia. 
(2) The second dependent variable we use is the number of bilateral patent citations. In particular 
we consider the yearly number of bilateral backward citations in patents signed by at least one inventor 
resident in the BRICSM to one of the G7 country. 
The inventors’ address is a more precise information than the applicant address. In dealing with 
developing countries, the applicant address may not contain the relevant information regarding the place 
where the innovative effort takes place. In many cases applicants are multinational corporations and in 
patent applications use the legal address of the headquarters even if the patent is the result of a 
collaborative effort with a foreign laboratory. Moreover in order to study technological collaborations it is 
much more appropriate to look at the inventor level, first because there are much more international 
collaborations if we look at international teams of inventors (with respects to patents that are co-applied by 
institutions in different countries) and secondly it is at the individual level that the real knowledge exchange 
takes place. To further justify this choice we show in the Appendix in Table A2 that the number 
international co-applications between a BRICSM country and a G7 country in the period 1997-2004 ranges 
between 19 in Mexico and 164 in China. Note that on average more than one third of these collaborations 
involve simply two individuals and that more than 10% involve a university in the BRICSM countries. 
 
4.1 International knowledge flows in the BRICSM. A descriptive analysis  
Table 1 and Table 2 show the total number of patents per country per year and the share of patents 
with at least a foreign inventor (resident in the G7 countries), respectively for BRICSM and the advanced 
countries. It shows that BRICSM countries have a substantial share of international patents which are co-
invented with the G7 countries, at the same time the same percentage is very small for the G7 countries. 
While on average for the BRICSM the share of international collaborations range between 15% and 60% 
(higher for Mexico and smaller for South Africa) for the G7 countries the same share ranges between 0.2% 
and 4% (higher for Canada and smaller for Japan). It is also important that this share is increasing in all the 
7 advanced countries while no clear patterns emerge from the BRICSM. The share of international 
collaborative patents seems to decline in China and India indicating a growing importance of domestic 
technological activity in these two countries. At the same time it displays a positive trend in Brazil, Mexico 
and Russia with a peak in the mid-nineties and then either the trend remains flat or declines.  
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Table 3 shows that total number of backward EPO citations of patents invented in the BRICSM 
countries. Only a minority represents citations that remain within the national borders (domestic citations). 
This is especially true for Mexico and China where only 2.7% and 3.1% are citations to domestic patents in 
2004. Table 4 shows the average number of domestic inventors per patent in the BRICSM. Again it is 
important to note the high share of foreign inventors in Mexico, the growing importance of domestic 
inventors in China and India while the opposite occurs in Russia. 
Table 5 shows the geographical reach of the BRICSM patents and Table 6 breaks down the 
BRICSM backward citations by countries of destination. Table 5 shows the number of patents with only 
national inventors, with at least an inventor from other BRICSM countries, the US, the EU (four 
countries) and Japan. If we consider two sub-periods, before and after 1996, Table 5 shows that the share 
of patents that have at least one inventor from the US tends to decrease for China, India and Mexico. The 
share of collaborative patents with the EU4 tends to decrease for all countries with the exception of 
Mexico and Russia. 
Table 6 displays the number of backward citations by destination country (and shares) before and 
after 1996. No major structural change occurs in the period observed. There is a slight increase in citations 
that stay within the same country, but the share of these citations remain very low with the exception of 
South Africa in recent years. Table 6 also shows that geographical distance may play a role since China, 
India and Russian Federation are more likely to cite Japanese patents than Latin American countries. 
Interestingly, Mexico is closer to the United States, while Brazil more to the Europe: in the period 97-2003 
40% of the citations of Mexican patents go to the US and 32% go to EU4 patents; while for Brazil we have 
the reversed picture with 39% of citations going to the EU4 and 30% of their citations going to US 
patents. 
Finally, Figure 1 and Figure 2 compare the technological composition of the collaborative patents 
with the one of the overall patenting activity in the BRICSM. Figure 1 shows that the BRICSM have 
different degrees and type of technological specializations. India and China have a higher degree of 
specialization: China in Electrical Engineering and India in Chemicals and Pharma. The other countries 
display a more uniform distribution across sectors with Brazil increasing substantially its technological 
activity in Pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, Figure 2, by showing the technological distribution of 
collaborative patents, indicates that for all countries at least half of the collaborative patents are 
concentrated in the fields of Chemical and Pharmaceuticals. This occurs also for those countries, like 
China, Russia, South Africa and Brazil, that do not display an overall specialization in these fields.   
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4.2 The Econometric model 
We estimate the impact of the IPRs strength and the TRIPS agreement on the international 
technological collaborations and on patent citations using a gravity model (Peri, 2005; Picci, 2008; 
Montobbio and Sterzi, 2012). Gravity models have been widely used in explaining trade flows. Disdier and 
Head (2008) show that the negative impact of distance on trade flows began to rise after the 1950s and 
remains high. Taking into account in their meta-analysis of approximately 1400 distance effects estimated 
in 103 different econometric papers, they show that the mean bilateral trade flow elasticity to distance is 
equal to 0.9 and challenge significantly the idea that with globalization distance is becoming less relevant.  
Peri (2005) analyses knowledge flows across region in a gravity framework using patent citations. 
He finds that knowledge flows go much farther than trade flow even if knowledge flows remain highly 
localized. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) studies technological internationalization of 
the OECD countries and show that small and low tech countries are more open. They also find that 
technological collaboration depends upon technological proximity and the presence of both a common 
language and a common border. Finally, Picci (2008) studies international collaboration using co-inventors 
and co-applicants of a set of patent applications at the European national patent offices and at the EPO 
and studies the increased level of technological collaborations of the European countries. He finds that 
distance, common language and common borders explain a substantial part of the variation in bilateral 
collaborations. 
In this vein this paper estimates the impact of IPRs reinforcement on different types of knowledge 
flows in the BRICSM countries using a gravity model. We follow a standard empirical implementation (e.g. 
Disdier and Head, 2008) for the expected value of xijt, that is, in our case, (1) the number of collaborations, 
where the number of domestic inventor is at least 20% of the total number of inventors, between 
developing country i and developed country j at time t or, alternatively, (2) the yearly number of bilateral 
backward citations in patents signed by at least an inventor resident in country i and citing a country j at 
time t. The gravity equation can be represented in the following equation: 
 
E[xijt]= A

itA

jtD

ijexp(ORIGij+ δTijt) IMPijt

 FDIit

IPR

ite
t       (1) 
 
In this equation A

it and A

jt measure specific characteristics of country i and j, Dij is the 
geographical distance (DISTANCEij)between them, where  is the “distance effect” and represents the 
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(negative) elasticity of bilateral patent citations or technological collaborations with respect to geographical 
distance. 
The main variable under scrutiny is the general strength of the domestic intellectual system (IPRit). 
This variable is the Ginarte and Park index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park and Wagh, 2002; Park, 2008). 
This index ranges from zero to five and its value is the un-weighted sum of five sub-indexes that range 
from 0 to 1: (1) extent of coverage (subject matter and types of invention), (2) membership in international 
treaties, (3) duration of protection, (4) absence of restrictions on rights (e.g. degree of exclusivity), and, 
finally, (5) statutory enforcement provisions (e.g. preliminary injunctions). Secondly, in order to capture the 
TRIPS effect in the emerging countries we rely upon a treatment variable TRIPSt which is equal to one if 
t≥ 1996 and zero elsewhere., and we test whether it has a positive impact on the bilateral technological 
collaborations and backward citations between country i and country j. For what concern the other 
variables, in the Appendix we provide a description of the datasets used (Table A3).  
In particular in our empirical application Ait and Ajt are the constant price gdp (GDPit and GDPit 
respectively for emerging and advanced country) and the total number of patent applications respectively 
of country i and country j, at time t (PATENTSit and PATENTSit). Moreover we control for some further 
specific characteristics of developing countries i. We also expect technological collaborations to be related 
to the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDIit). Finally we augment the gravity model by including 
bilateral imports (IMPijt) which represents the value of country I import from country j. 
T represents the technological proximity (TPijt) between emerging and advanced countries. It is 
measured by the uncentered correlation of the two countries’ distribution vectors of patents across 30 
technological classes (OST, 2004) at time t (Pi and Pj ), as follows: TPij = PiP’j/[(PiP’i)(PjPj)]
1/2
.
 This indicator 
typically ranges between 0 and 1 for all other pairs of countries. It is equal to one for the pairs of countries 
with identical distribution of technological activities; it is equal to zero if the distributions are orthogonal 
(Jaffe, 1988). Finally a dummy indicating a common legal origin (ORIGij) which is equal to one if i and j 
have a common legal origin (La Porta et al. ,1999).  
Our dependent variables are non-negative integers and challenge the use of linear regression models 
such as OLS. Moreover, since their distribution is highly skewed and the frequency of zeros is quite 
important (30%), we rely upon the PPML estimator, as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), 
with the classical Huber and White sandwich estimator of variance (Huber, 1967, White, 1980). Finally, 
since observations in pairs of countries are likely to be dependent across years, robust standard errors are 
clustered to control for error correlation in the panel (Cameron and Golotvina, 2005). All the regressions 
contain a full set of time dummies (t) to control for time varying un-observables that are common across 
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countries or, alternatively, a non-linear trend. Moreover we include unobserved individual time constant 
effect specific to country i and country j (in the Tables reported as POISSON estimates). Table 5 shows 
the regression variables statistics. 
5. Results 
In this section we present the estimates of the gravity models. In column (1)-(3) we run simple 
POISSON regressions with individual time constant effects specific to emerging and advanced country; in 
column (4) and (5) we run fixed effects POISSON regressions which include fixed effects relative to each 
specific pair of countries. Moreover all models contain a full set of time dummies which capture any time 
shock that is common to all bilateral relations.  
First we estimate the effect of our selected determinants on knowledge flows measured by patterns 
of co-inventorship (Table 8). Secondly we ask how the same determinants affect the transfer of knowledge 
captured by patent citations (Table 9). A group of results are common in the two sets of regressions. The 
estimates show that the gravity model is asymmetric because the masses measured by patenting activity and 
GDP have different effect according to emerging and advanced country. In particular patenting activity has 
a positive and significant effect only in the case of patent applications by emerging country (ln 
PATENTSit). 
Secondly, looking at column (1) of Table 8 and 9 it is possible to see that DISTANCEij is 
significantly negative. This could suggest that communication and transportation costs might play a 
significant role in determining the geographical scope of knowledge flows. Note that the estimated effect 
of DISTANCE is larger for technological collaborations (-0.39 vs. -0.14).  However it is important to 
underline that, for both types of knowledge flows, what we observe in column (1) is not only a direct effect 
of geographical distance on knowledge flows but also an indirect effect through trade. 
 International trade theory has shown that geographical distance significantly affects trade flows 
and so, if we omit trade in the model, we capture both effects. However, the estimated distance elasticity is 
no more significant once we include the other covariates in the regressions (columns (2) and (3)). In 
particular, the inclusion of bilateral trade relationships overturns the effects of geographical distance. In 
sum columns (2) and (3) in both Tables 8 and 9 show the direct distance elasticity on knowledge flows and 
show that controlling for trade (and other broader set of variables) it is no more statistically different from 
zero. 
The elasticity of bilateral import is positive and significant in POISSON regression in line with the 
literature on knowledge spillover (Coe and Helpman, 1995), and the effect is stronger for technological 
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collaborations. In Table 8 and 9 in the POISSON Fixed Effect models the impact of trade is not 
statistically significant. FDIs have not a significant effect or have a weakly negative one in the model with 
patent citations.  
Finally if geographical distance is no more significant once controlling for trade, other forms of 
distances - such as having a common legal origin (ORIGij) and similarity in the technological distribution of 
the inventive activity (TPijt) - have still a significant effect. In particular, having a common legal origin 
increases the expected number of collaborations by a factor of 1.60, holding all other variables constant. 
The effect is positive also for patent citations. Conversely technological proximity is positive and 
significant only for technological collaborations. TPijt is not positively related to backward citations in 
POISSON models, and in addition, controlling for unobserved pair characteristics through fixed effect 
models (columns 4 and 5), it appears negative and significant. 
Our results do not highlight any positive effect of strengthening IPRs on knowledge flows 
(technological collaborations and patent citations) neither in POISSON models nor in POISSON FE 
models. For the BRICSM countries, variations in the IPR variable can be directly related to the compliance 
to the TRIPS agreements in 1996. To control for this possibility we introduce also the variable TRIPSt (a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the year 1996-2004 and zero otherwise) in order to control for that 
portion of variation that can be attributed to this agreement. Table 8 shows that the estimated coefficient 
of the TRIPS agreement on international technological collaborations is negative but still not significantly 
different from zero (column (3) and (5)).  Altogether these results do not provide any signal of a positive 
effect of IPRs reinforcement on knowledge flows captured by international patenting collaborations.  
Table 9 shows that in the case of patent citations strengthening IPRs, differently from the 
international collaborations case, has a negative and significant impact on the international knowledge 
flows. In particular, the TRIPS variable has a significant and negative effect on the number of citations, 
also controlling for the IPRs index. According to estimates in column (3) and (5), after the 1996 Trips 
agreement the expected number of backward citations is decreased by a factor of 0.03, holding all other 
variables constant. In sum our evidence using EPO patents suggests that IPRs has not a strong effect on 
knowledge flows. In particular when we measure them using patent citations, which we assume to track 
codified knowledge, the effect is negative and emerging countries seem to be less able to use the 
knowledge produced in the advanced countries. When we measure knowledge flows using co-inventorship, 
which we assume to be a proxy knowledge that is transmitted through interpersonal and face to face 
contacts, the effect of IPRs is not statistically significant. 
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6. Conclusion 
As innovation goes global, there is a rising demand for global knowledge governance. This issue is at 
the center of the political debate in advanced, as well as in emerging and developing economies. However, 
which mix of policies better supports the generation and diffusion of knowledge in global economies on a 
faire basis is still an open debate. Shortcuts are probably not the best policy options when innovation and 
the building of capacities and capabilities for innovation are at stake. And this is especially in the case of 
catching up and developing economies, which on the one hand, require targeted policies to support the 
generation of domestics capabilities, but which on the other hand, also require specific policies to support 
learning and contacts with more advanced counterparts to support their domestic efforts and to facilitate 
the transfer and the absorption of capabilities, routines, and practices, beyond traditional technology 
transfer. 
Innovation is increasingly the result of the combination of knowledge, know-how, competences and 
techniques whose generation and diffusion occur usually involving international counterparts. Research 
and inventions with industrial applications will increasingly be a global phenomena. However, the 
possibility for catching up and developing economies of profiting from increased opportunities of 
collaboration cannot rely on market forces alone. A mix of policies is needed to support the generation of 
domestic capabilities and to support a virtuous integration to the global knowledge economies.  
In developing countries access to foreign technologies, collaboration with foreign counterparts, 
both in the domestic country and abroad is a hot political issue. Scientific research increasingly involves 
international counterparts and mobility of researchers is on the rise. Collaborative links with foreign 
laboratories rely more on relational and capability proximity than on geographical distance. Also, 
multinationals are increasingly delocalizing R&D activities in host countries, spurring a debate on which are 
the conditions under which the local community of researchers and firms can learn by tapping into foreign 
collaborative networks. 
Governments, for example in Brazil, in Mexico as well as in India, set up different types of 
incentives for their researchers to build close interpersonal collaboration with foreign researchers, and 
encourage local firms to collaborate with foreign subsidiaries to access foreign knowledge, or support 
delocalization of firms to learn from foreign practices in foreign markets. However, while those policies are 
managed under the innovation policy umbrella, there are other policies affecting international knowledge 
flows and learning by collaborating: mainly IP regulations. Perfect coordination in policy design is not 
realistic, not even in developed countries, but synchronization between policies is desirable.  
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In this context our paper contributes in two ways. First of all we compare the economic and 
institutional determinants of two types of knowledge flows. The ones that flow disembodied and codified 
and the ones that, since technical knowledge is in many aspect specific and tacit, are transmitted through 
face to face contacts. We show the economic and institutional barriers that exist to these knowledge flows 
between advanced and emerging countries. We show that geographical distance (e.g. communications and 
transport costs) has an indirect effect on knowledge flows in particular through trade. We show that 
sharing a common legal origin and in some technological proximity may favor the transfer of knowledge.  
Our results show also that when knowledge is tacit the economic and institutional determinants of 
knowledge flows have a stronger impact. The impact of bilateral imports and sharing a common legal 
origin is two times larger in the case of international technological collaborations compared to patent 
citations.  
Secondly we discuss the impact on knowledge diffusion of intellectual property reinforcement in 
emerging countries. Intellectual property regimes are, as all economic and legal institutions, context and 
time specific, and they are subject to change. In terms of evolution of intellectual property rights, if a 
lesson can be derived from history, it is that systems evolved as pulled by the production side. When, in a 
given country, the introduction of IP protection could bring about a pecuniary gain in a given sector or 
area, the system was adapted, or a negotiation initiated to grant the right of appropriation of the relative 
rent. In contrast, sectors, lobbies (and countries) attempted to block the introduction of IP protection in 
cases in which they were net importers of the product or service in question. 
Our paper contributes to this policy debate with a warning flag. Our evidence suggests that there 
may be some adverse effects on knowledge flows generated by the reinforcement of IPRs in emerging 
economies and in particular by the TRIPs agreements. In particular our estimates tend to show that IPRs 
reinforcement has not a positive effect on both types knowledge flows between the BRICSM countries and 
the G7 countries.  
In terms of political economy, having a national strategy for scientific, industrial and technological 
development lays the foundations for strategically using IP for development. The strengthening and 
homogenization of IP could jeopardize some ongoing learning processes base con collaboration in 
catching up and emerging economies. However, the debate on intellectual property seems more oriented 
towards technology transfers and markets for knowledge rather than on a critical reflection of current 
norms. On the contrary, in advanced countries, there is a rising concern that current IP management could 
harm instead of supporting innovation. Probably there is a window of opportunity for twisting the debate 
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and contextualizing IP management in a wider logic of knowledge circulation and appropriability. Whether 
the BRICSM will take the lead on this is an open question.  
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Table 1. Patents and collaborative patents (by inventors), BRICSM countries, EPO patents 
 BRAZIL CHINA INDIA MEXICO RUSSIA SOUTH AFRICA 
year Tot
al 
Collabor
ative 
% Total Colla
borat
ive 
% Total Collab
orative 
% To
tal 
Collabora
tive 
% To
tal 
Collaborat
ive 
% To
tal 
Collabora
tive 
% 
1990 51 10 20% 36 9 25% 34 17 50% 18 5 28% 72 4 6% 63 8 13% 
1991 35 9 26% 38 13 34% 22 10 45% 14 2 14% 90 13 14% 71 8 11% 
1992 58 16 28% 45 18 40% 31 13 42% 16 7 44% 143 29 20% 126 12 10% 
1993 60 14 23% 45 26 58% 44 26 59% 25 16 64% 148 39 26% 108 18 17% 
1994 45 12 27% 54 18 33% 34 21 62% 22 14 64% 173 56 32% 84 9 11% 
1995 77 34 44% 74 31 42% 45 20 44% 35 17 49% 169 53 31% 92 20 22% 
1996 69 24 35% 93 36 39% 74 32 43% 30 11 37% 216 70 32% 94 15 16% 
1997 109 26 24% 133 55 41% 83 25 30% 58 22 38% 213 74 35% 152 19 13% 
1998 115 66 57% 153 49 32% 147 53 36% 47 24 51% 255 87 34% 163 26 16% 
1999 142 31 22% 250 67 27% 183 72 39% 56 26 46% 279 105 38% 154 24 16% 
2000 137 36 26% 406 136 33% 224 69 31% 42 22 52% 287 100 35% 165 37 22% 
2001 171 51 30% 509 128 25% 321 77 24% 59 27 46% 301 101 34% 132 22 17% 
2002 153 33 22% 692 166 24% 499 109 22% 67 31 46% 238 87 37% 144 18 13% 
2003 201 46 23% 1136 216 19% 597 178 30% 86 34 40% 277 101 36% 151 17 11% 
2004 212 69 33% 1256 243 19% 591 186 31% 70 34 49% 280 93 33% 149 27 18% 
TOTAL 1635 477 29% 4920 1211 25% 2929 908 31% 645 292 45% 3141 1012 32% 1848 280 15% 
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Table 2. Patents and collaborative patents (by inventors), G7 countries, EPO patents 
  USA JAPAN GERMANY UK ITALY CANADA FRANCE 
  Total Coll. %  Total Coll. %  Total Coll. %  Total Coll. %  Total Coll. %  Total Coll. %  Total Coll. %  
                                            
1990 124957 673 0.54% 92078 271 0.29% 82838 351 0.42% 26404 319 1.21% 16184 96 0.59% 4263 109 2.56% 35462 197 0.56% 
1991 124516 788 0.63% 83055 256 0.31% 82103 409 0.50% 26019 391 1.50% 16660 98 0.59% 4494 155 3.45% 35819 241 0.67% 
1992 127862 886 0.69% 77581 271 0.35% 83594 465 0.56% 26019 414 1.59% 15722 104 0.66% 4879 172 3.53% 33803 262 0.78% 
1993 133539 945 0.71% 79114 244 0.31% 85470 430 0.50% 26467 407 1.54% 16415 108 0.66% 5313 175 3.29% 35231 325 0.92% 
1994 142107 1120 0.79% 78008 309 0.40% 91469 544 0.59% 27923 473 1.69% 16954 128 0.75% 5691 182 3.20% 36596 316 0.86% 
1995 158431 1262 0.80% 89054 320 0.36% 95578 615 0.64% 29421 548 1.86% 18109 154 0.85% 6727 241 3.58% 38038 386 1.01% 
1996 168504 1470 0.87% 101094 364 0.36% 114513 816 0.71% 32830 704 2.14% 21217 208 0.98% 7518 266 3.54% 41916 554 1.32% 
1997 188762 1922 1.02% 108241 415 0.38% 128639 1013 0.79% 35791 814 2.27% 23254 244 1.05% 10059 383 3.81% 47117 671 1.42% 
1998 205604 2137 1.04% 113918 502 0.44% 144606 1255 0.87% 39900 882 2.21% 24605 254 1.03% 11564 461 3.99% 50925 747 1.47% 
1999 221781 2486 1.12% 131663 522 0.40% 155169 1433 0.92% 44933 1042 2.32% 27265 273 1.00% 13132 533 4.06% 54481 845 1.55% 
2000 227108 2784 1.23% 151669 527 0.35% 162890 1691 1.04% 47110 1194 2.53% 29519 357 1.21% 13608 598 4.39% 55678 983 1.77% 
2001 220850 2597 1.18% 138530 480 0.35% 160356 1486 0.93% 44170 1228 2.78% 29239 316 1.08% 14056 611 4.35% 55636 988 1.78% 
2002 228291 2569 1.13% 140420 559 0.40% 158872 1598 1.01% 42819 1132 2.64% 30618 341 1.11% 14238 557 3.91% 56182 1040 1.85% 
2003 232176 2615 1.13% 147798 500 0.34% 160923 1633 1.01% 42371 1067 2.52% 31976 380 1.19% 14623 584 3.99% 60200 1091 1.81% 
2004 233919 2759 1.18% 153195 524 0.34% 166208 1696 1.02% 41566 1183 2.85% 32599 390 1.20% 16478 561 3.40% 61922 1097 1.77% 
TOTAL 2738407 27013 0.99% 1685418 6064 0.36% 1873228 15435 0.82% 533743 ### 2.21% 350336 3451 0.99% 146643 5588 3.81% 699006 9743 1.39% 
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Table 3. Total number of backward citations to EPO patents and their equivalents by year.  
  Brazil China India Mexico Russia South Africa 
  
Domestic  
Only 
 
Domestic  
Only  
(%) 
Total 
 
 
Domestic  
Only 
 
Domestic  
Only  
(%) 
Total 
 
 
Domestic  
Only 
 
Domestic Only  
(%) 
Total 
 
 
Domestic Only 
 
Domestic Only  
(%) 
Total 
 
 
Domestic Only 
 
Domestic Only  
(%) 
Total 
 
 
National  
Only 
 
National  
Only  
(%) 
Total 
 
 
1990 3 3,7% 81 1 1,6% 63 10 14,9% 67 2 8,0% 25 6 8,1% 74 15 15,3% 98 
1991 7 8,1% 86 4 5,3% 76 5 6,3% 79 1 12,5% 8 2 1,4% 141 12 9,5% 126 
1992 1 0,9% 113 3 3,0% 99 2 3,9% 51 0 0,0% 39 8 3,7% 219 46 15,1% 305 
1993 1 0,7% 139 7 3,4% 205 0 0,0% 113 3 4,0% 75 14 3,7% 378 31 10,6% 292 
1994 4 3,8% 105 4 3,4% 119 2 1,7% 117 0 0,0% 57 13 3,2% 401 20 8,9% 225 
1995 6 3,4% 174 4 2,1% 194 3 2,7% 113 4 5,3% 75 34 6,2% 546 13 5,7% 227 
1996 3 2,1% 145 9 4,4% 204 3 1,4% 208 4 3,6% 112 48 8,7% 553 19 7,3% 260 
1997 9 3,1% 287 16 4,0% 404 9 3,5% 256 6 3,2% 185 46 7,5% 612 69 16,1% 428 
1998 8 1,4% 567 7 1,5% 480 18 5,3% 341 5 2,9% 172 81 7,9% 1031 62 14,1% 441 
1999 13 2,6% 493 24 3,2% 753 31 4,4% 711 6 4,1% 146 61 8,5% 719 42 11,4% 370 
2000 14 4,2% 335 40 3,4% 1181 45 6,5% 688 7 5,1% 138 61 8,9% 684 49 13,6% 360 
2001 16 4,7% 341 43 3,5% 1226 61 8,0% 760 3 1,6% 182 71 11,7% 608 37 18,5% 200 
2002 9 3,5% 255 59 4,3% 1370 66 6,5% 1012 8 5,9% 135 45 9,7% 463 22 10,8% 204 
2003 19 8,7% 218 48 2,7% 1798 63 6,8% 921 5 4,8% 105 37 8,9% 418 25 10,9% 229 
2004 7 8,5% 82 25 3,1% 808 19 6,2% 306 1 2,7% 37 9 6,8% 132 3 8,1% 37 
 
 
 
Table 4. Average number of domestic inventors per EPO patent in the BRICSM (only BRICSM invented patents) 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Brazil  71% 60% 75% 
China 59% 65% 74% 
India 59% 71% 78% 
Mexico 49% 56% 60% 
Russia 83% 76% 73% 
South Africa 87% 79% 81% 
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Table 5. Geographical distribution of EPO patents before and after Trips. Number of patents and shares by region  
  
Only national co-
inventors Other BRICSM Us eu4 Japan 
  90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 
Brazil 394 73,5% 1025 73,5% 3 0,6% 4 0,3% 43 8,0% 126 9,0% 70 13,1% 149 10,7% 2 0,4% 8 0,6% 
China  382 67,6% 3257 74,5% 4 0,7% 5 0,1% 74 13,1% 473 10,8% 43 7,6% 229 5,2% 26 4,6% 65 1,5% 
India 283 64,5% 2038 73,8% 2 0,5% 3 0,1% 87 19,8% 390 14,1% 42 9,6% 161 5,8% 6 1,4% 15 0,5% 
Mexico 161 63,9% 411 66,1% 1 0,4% 3 0,5% 52 20,6% 113 18,2% 17 6,7% 61 9,8% 2 0,8% 3 0,5% 
Russia 1006 71,8% 1846 66,8% 2 0,1% 5 0,2% 103 7,3% 300 10,9% 136 9,7% 306 11,1% 15 1,1% 25 0,9% 
S. Africa 642 84,5% 1055 83,1% 4 0,5% 2 0,2% 24 3,2% 57 4,5% 64 8,4% 94 7,4% 1 0,1% 1 0,1% 
 
 
Table 6. Number of backward citations to EPO patents by destination country (and shares) before and after Trips 
  national citations Other BRICSM Us eu4 Japan 
  90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 90-96 97-03 
Brazil 25 3,0% 95 3,7% 2 0,2% 24 0,9% 282 33,5% 777 30,3% 307 36,5% 959 37,4% 82 9,7% 277 10,8% 
China  32 3,3% 262 3,3% 3 0,3% 31 0,4% 319 33,2% 2634 33,0% 282 29,4% 1994 25,0% 199 20,7% 1333 16,7% 
India 25 3,4% 312 6,3% 5 0,7% 37 0,7% 280 37,8% 1743 35,1% 221 29,9% 1303 26,2% 102 13,8% 683 13,7% 
Mexico 14 3,6% 41 3,8% 2 0,5% 9 0,8% 153 39,2% 404 37,0% 135 34,6% 349 31,9% 31 7,9% 97 8,9% 
Russia 125 5,4% 411 8,9% 4 0,2% 25 0,5% 697 30,2% 1641 35,3% 715 31,0% 1239 26,7% 402 17,4% 610 13,1% 
S. Africa 156 10,2% 309 12,0% 6 0,4% 13 0,5% 419 27,4% 700 27,3% 521 34,1% 644 25,1% 145 9,5% 200 7,8% 
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Table 7 . Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Collaborative patents 
Number of EPO patents with at least an inventor 
from country i (emerging) and country j 
(advanced)where the weight of domestic inventors 
is at least 20% of the. 595 5.33 11.68 0 127 
Patent citations 
Number of EPO citations made by patents of 
country i to patents of country j in year t. 595 17.82 30.42 0 270 
ln PATENTSit 
Number of EPO patent applications in year t with 
at least an inventor residing in country i and j 
respectively (in logarithm). 
595 4.66 .95 2.70 7.13 
ln PATENTSjt 595 8.88 1.02 6.41 10.41 
ln GDPit Millions of constant US dollars, (year 2000 prices) 
(in logarithm). 
595 12.89 .68 11.58 14.35 
ln GDPjt 595 28.25 .84 26.99 29.99 
ln IMPijt 
Bilateral imports, millions of US dollars, current 
prices (in logarithm). 595 7.62 1.19 1.79 11.62 
ln FDIit 
Inward - millions of constant US dollars, (year 2000 
prices) (in logarithm). 595 8.31 2.01 0 11.01 
ln DISTANCEij 
Km, simple distance which uses latitudes and 
longitudes of the most important 
cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) (in 
logarithm). 595 8.94 .50 7.63 9.82 
ORIGij 
Dummy which equals to one if the two countries 
have a common legal origin 595 .25 .43 0 1 
TPijt Indicator of pairwise "technological proximity" 595 .68 .12 .26 .94 
ln IPRit 
Ginarte and Park Index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; 
Park 2008) (in logarithm). 595 .83 .48 .02 1.44 
TRIPSt 
Dummy equals to one if t≥ 1996 and zero 
elsewhere. 595 .63 .48 0 1 
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Table 8. The impact of IPRs on Collaborative Patents: BRICSM Countries 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
VARIABLES POISSON POISSON POISSON 
POISSON 
FE 
POISSON 
FE 
            
ln PATENTSit 0.82*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.084) (0.085) 
ln PATENTSjt 0.20 0.34 0.63 0.38 0.47 
  (0.36) (0.41) (0.68) (0.35) (0.47) 
ln GDPit -0.33 -0.50 -0.38 -0.23 -0.20 
  (0.31) (0.36) (0.40) (0.32) (0.33) 
ln GDPjt 1.09 1.35* 1.73* 1.39** 1.50** 
  (0.78) (0.78) (0.91) (0.59) (0.71) 
ln IMPijt   0.19* 0.19* -0.027 -0.023 
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.076) (0.077) 
ln FDIit   -0.062 -0.048 -0.048 -0.044 
    (0.049) (0.050) (0.036) (0.038) 
ln DISTANCEij -0.39*** -0.11 -0.11     
  (0.061) (0.19) (0.19)     
ORIGij 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.47***     
  (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)     
TPijt 1.70*** 1.51*** 1.51*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
  (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) 
ln IPRit -0.056 -0.062 -0.016 0.0080 0.021 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
TRIPSt     -0.52   -0.16 
      (0.73)   (0.54) 
Constant -28.6 -37.4** -51.1*     
  (18.6) (18.3) (26.4)     
            
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country i dummy Yes Yes Yes No No 
Country j dummy Yes Yes Yes No No 
Log likelihood -1098.10 -1090.35 -1089.87 -875.50 -875.46 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
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Table 9. The impact of Trips on Patent Citations 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
VARIABLES POISSON POISSON POISSON 
POISSON 
FE 
POISSON 
FE 
            
ln PATENTSit 1.27*** 1.25*** 1.16*** 1.24*** 1.15*** 
  (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.048) (0.049) 
ln PATENTSjt -1.15*** -0.82* 1.00** -0.89*** 0.91*** 
  (0.43) (0.47) (0.47) (0.20) (0.27) 
ln GDPit -0.75*** -0.88*** 0.013 -0.61*** 0.15 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.18) (0.20) 
ln GDPjt -1.14** -0.91 0.94* -0.78*** 1.04*** 
  (0.54) (0.56) (0.56) (0.30) (0.34) 
ln IMPijt   0.094** 0.084** -0.059 -0.0044 
    (0.038) (0.036) (0.045) (0.045) 
ln FDIit   -0.078** 0.018 -0.073*** 0.016 
    (0.032) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018) 
ln DISTANCEij -0.13*** -0.028 -0.053     
  (0.027) (0.055) (0.053)     
ORIGij 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.21***     
  (0.060) (0.054) (0.049)     
TPijt 0.22 0.098 0.12 -0.54*** -0.43** 
  (0.29) (0.27) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) 
ln IPRit -0.24* -0.25* 0.11 -0.21*** 0.12 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.080) (0.086) 
TRIPSt     -3.31***   -3.21*** 
      (0.45)   (0.29) 
Constant 44.0*** 36.4*** -37.4**     
  (12.6) (13.3) (17.1)     
            
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country i dummy Yes Yes Yes No No 
Country j dummy Yes Yes Yes No No 
Log likelihood -1741.87 -1725.30 -1655.97 -1529.23 -1467.63 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Figure 1. Share of total patents by technological class (patents by inventors, years: 1990-2004)  
 
 
Figure 2. Share of collaborative patents by technological class (patents by inventors, years: 1990-2004)  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Number of collaborative patents and number of (real) collaborative patents with at least 20% of domestic inventors in the 
inventors’ team (EPO patents). 
 
  
 year Collabor
ative
Real 
Collabor
ative
% Real Collabor
ative
Real 
Collabor
ative
% Real Collabor
ative
Real 
Collabor
ative
% Real Collabor
ative
Real 
Collabor
ative
% Real Collabor
ative
Real 
Collabor
ative
% Real Collabor
ative
Real 
Collabor
ative
% Real
1990 10 9 90% 9 7 78% 17 13 76% 5 5 100% 4 4 100% 8 8 100%
1991 9 8 89% 13 10 77% 10 9 90% 2 2 100% 13 13 100% 8 7 88%
1992 16 12 75% 18 10 56% 13 13 100% 7 6 86% 29 29 100% 12 11 92%
1993 14 11 79% 26 15 58% 26 15 58% 16 13 81% 39 39 100% 18 18 100%
1994 12 10 83% 18 12 67% 21 12 57% 14 12 86% 56 52 93% 9 8 89%
1995 34 26 76% 31 23 74% 20 13 65% 17 15 88% 53 49 92% 20 17 85%
1996 24 17 71% 36 33 92% 32 22 69% 11 8 73% 70 61 87% 15 12 80%
1997 26 19 73% 55 40 73% 25 21 84% 22 15 68% 74 71 96% 19 15 79%
1998 66 23 35% 49 40 82% 53 39 74% 24 21 88% 87 80 92% 26 16 62%
1999 31 15 48% 67 49 73% 72 62 86% 26 23 88% 105 91 87% 24 15 63%
2000 36 25 69% 136 93 68% 69 45 65% 22 16 73% 100 88 88% 37 36 97%
2001 51 38 75% 128 98 77% 77 60 78% 27 25 93% 101 92 91% 22 20 91%
2002 33 30 91% 166 117 70% 109 95 87% 31 24 77% 87 75 86% 18 13 72%
2003 46 36 78% 216 174 81% 178 141 79% 34 28 82% 101 90 89% 17 13 76%
2004 69 55 80% 243 169 70% 186 142 76% 34 23 68% 93 82 88% 27 23 85%
TOTAL 477 334 70% 1211 890 73% 908 702 77% 292 236 81% 1012 916 91% 280 232 83%
CHINA INDIA MEXICO SOUTH AFRICABRAZIL RUSSIA
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Table A2. Co-applicant: relationship by typology of applicant. Number of co-applied patents and percentage by typology of 
institution (EPO patents). 
Co-applicant relationship Brazil         90-96 
Brazil            97-
04 
China        90-96 China        97-04 India        90-96 India        97-04 
Individual-Individual 1 25% 19 40% 20 59% 57 35% 7 50% 55 34% 
Individual-University 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 2 1% 
Individual-Company 0 0% 4 9% 1 3% 14 9% 0 0% 24 15% 
University-Individual 0 0% 0 0% 2 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
University-University 1 25% 2 4% 0 0% 8 5% 0 0% 0 0% 
University-Company 0 0% 2 4% 6 18% 14 9% 0 0% 3 2% 
Company-Individual 0 0% 5 11% 0 0% 4 2% 0 0% 5 3% 
Company-University 0 0% 2 4% 0 0% 2 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Company-Company 2 50% 13 28% 5 15% 64 39% 7 50% 71 44% 
Total 4 100% 47 100% 34 100% 164 100% 14 100% 160 100% 
Co-applicant relationship Mexico    90-96 
Mexico 
97-04 
Russia 
90-96 
Russia 
97-04 
South Africa  
90-96 
South Africa  
97-04 
Individual-Individual 1 20% 7 37% 33 32% 71 48% 7 35% 16 33% 
Individual-University 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 
Individual-Company 0 0% 2 11% 8 8% 23 16% 1 5% 3 6% 
University-Individual 0 0% 0 0% 2 2% 4 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
University-University 0 0% 2 11% 0 0% 0 0% 1 5% 4 8% 
University-Company 1 20% 1 5% 15 15% 12 8% 1 5% 4 8% 
Company-Individual 0 0% 1 5% 1 1% 3 2% 3 15% 6 13% 
Company-University 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 6% 
Company-Company 3 60% 5 26% 43 42% 34 23% 7 35% 11 23% 
Total 5 100% 19 100% 102 100% 147 100% 20 100% 48 100% 
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Table A3. Description of the database by source 
Variable source 
PATENT APPLICATIONS Ep-Kites (Patstat) Database 
TRADE Stan Bilateral Trade Database (GRAND TOTAL) 
GDP WDI Online (World Bank) 
IPR index Park W. (2008) 
FDI Unctad 
DISTANCE CEPII dataset 
LEGAL ORIGIN La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
